Exporting Democracy to Haiti:

A Military Perspective

A Monograph
by
Major Jean-Michel T. Guerin
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Major Jean-Michel T. Guerin

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Approved by:

Michael D. Mihalka, Ph.D.	Monograph Director
Charles Webster, COL, IN	Second Reader
Stefan Banach, COL, IN	Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.	Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Abstract

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY TO HAITI: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE by Major Jean-Michel T. Guerin, USA, 62 pages.

The United States' democratization strategy since World War II demonstrates an estimated success rate of less than 3%. America currently uses a counterinsurgency / line of effort approach in democratization. This approach seeks to shape an environment that protects democratic behavior but fails to address a country's democratic propensities, more specifically the potential of its attitudes and values with respect to democracy. A superior method is the path-dependent approach that seeks to exploit the potential of a country's prevailing attitudes and values by harnessing its democratic propensities. This paper analyzes the American military interventions of Haiti in 1915, 1994, and 2004 from a path-dependent perspective to determine whether it could have enabled better results. The United States used a counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization during its first and second interventions in Haiti; both resulted in a failure to affect Haiti's democratic propensities. The United States used a hybrid path-dependent and counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization during its third intervention of Haiti resulting in a tangible enrichment of Haiti's democratic propensities. The results suggest a path-dependent approach to stability operations has a better probability of success than the current approach used by the United States.

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Chapter One - Introduction

The United States committed its armed forces to more than 200 operations abroad during its relatively short history. Approximately 10% of these operations were declared and/or conventional wars, the remainder were what we now categorize as Stability Operations. The problem is that the majority of these stability operations have failed to produce a stability that lasted longer than a decade after the withdrawal of military forces. Thus, the research question is whether the United States' military should refine or replace its current counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach to stability operations. This approach typically seeks to establish stability by shaping an environment where democratic behaviors are protected but fail to address democratic attitudes and values. A path-dependent approach is superior because it accounts for preexisting attitudes and values when developing a course of action towards democratic transition and consolidation. This paper assesses the competitive advantages of the two approaches using case studies on the United States military interventions of Haiti in 1915 and 1994; the latter case includes the 2004 intervention.

The enduring value of this study is best illustrated by the global geopolitical situation of the past century. At the beginning of the 20th century not a single country existed where the standards of a modern democratic form of governance were met.[1] The situation changed throughout the century as what had started out in 1828 as an experimental trend in self-governance evolved into a legitimate global phenomenon coined the second wave by author Samuel P. Huntington.[2] Despite the exponential increase in the overall number of sovereign political systems during the second wave, only an estimated 25% of them met the standards of a

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[1] Larry Diamond, "International Relations: A Report Card on Democracy," *Hoover's Digest* 3 (2000), 1.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 21.

modern democratic form of governance by 1975.[3] In Huntington's third wave, the number of modern democracies was propelled to 36% in 1989 and 46% by 1999 where a plateau was reached.[4]

Unfortunately, the evolution of political systems over the past decade has hinted at the resurgence in authoritarian tendencies and systems of governance.[5] Further analysis of the data and trends indicate that several so-called democracies could be more accurately defined as countries in transition, or semi-authoritarian regimes rather than true democracies.[6] Today an estimated one-quarter to one-half of all countries in the world have neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian regimes.[7] The most disturbing trend presented in a 2008 Freedom House Special Report is that 20%, 43 of the roughly 192 sovereign states assessed in the report, showed a decline in their Freedom indices.[8] Whether, this statistic hints at the onset of a third reverse wave of democratization remains to be seen. Compared to the post-wave plateaus experienced after the first and second waves, this plateau is markedly different with regard to the magnitude of support by the citizens of the developed world for exporting democracy. In America, 51% of the population supports democratization, and in Europe, 74% of the population supports

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[3] Diamond, "International Relations: A Report Card on Democracy," 2.

[4] Marcus Walker, "After the Wall: A Debate Over Democracy's Reach," *Wall Street Journal*, October 29, 2009.

[5] Arch Puddington, ed., *Special Report: Freedom of Association Under Threat, The New Authoritarians' Offensive Against Civil Society* (Washington D.C.: Freedom House, Inc., 2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=384&key=145&parent=13&report=74 (accessed April 24, 2010).

[6] The National Endowment for Democracy, *The Backlash against Democracy Promotion* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf (accessed September 12, 2009), 11.

[7] Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13:1 (2002).

[8] Arch Puddington, ed., *Special Report: Freedom of Association Under Threat, The New Authoritarians' Offensive Against Civil Society.*

democratization; typically through organizations like the United Nations (UN), Group of Eight (G-8), or European Union (EU).[9]

The United States first articulated a foreign policy of exporting democracy in 1904 through Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in response to the existential threat it perceived from European powers.[10] The increasing influence of communism in the 1960s renewed the United States' existential fears and is credited as being the impetus for elevating the promotion of democracy to a major tenet of its foreign policy.[11] Since then, the United States government has shown the willingness and the tendency to use its armed forces to pursue this agenda. The relevance of this trend to the United States military is even more poignant when the sum total of these missions is compared to sum total of major wars in which the United States government has used its military. Indeed, of the more than 200 operations the United States government has used its military in since 1798, only about a dozen were major conventional wars and another dozen major conventional operations of limited duration. The vast majority of these operations were some variant of exporting democracy, or at the very least intervening in foreign governmental affairs, typically under the pretext of promoting freedom through the protection of national interests.[12]

That a sustainable democracy is dependent on first transitioning to a democratic form of governance is readily apparent and accounted for by the counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach. However, a consolidated democracy occurs only after a society adopts and internalizes

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[9] The National Endowment for Democracy, *The Backlash against Democracy Promotion*, 11.

[10] Lester H. Brune, *The Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations Volume I* (New York: Garland, 1985), 276.

[11] Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 20.

[12] U.S. Naval Historical Center, "Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798 – 1993," U.S. Department of the Navy, http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm (accessed September 12, 2009).

the attitudes, beliefs, and constitution to ensure the propagation of sustainable democratic tendencies.[13] The counterinsurgency / lines of effort strategy is based on three interrelated instincts: a generic democratic template based on established democracies, institutional development modeled on reproducing those existing in established democracies, and a phased sequence consisting of transition, elections, and consolidation.[14] Unfortunately, the counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach does not account for the implications that a country's previous regime and sense of relationship between state, nation, and democracy, have on the shaping of its democratic attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore, how those attitudes and beliefs shape the paths available for the country to realize a successful democratic transition and consolidation. So, by design, the failure to address attitudes and beliefs means the counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach can only produce a consolidated democracy by happenstance, which in this context is defined statistically as less than 3% of the time.[15]

In contrast the path-dependent approach is based on a strategy that offers several metrics instrumental to democracy-building which illustrate how attitudes and beliefs translate to sustainable democracies.

Democratic transition: [16]

"...is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure."

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[13] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6.

[14] Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, 333.

[15] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Gun-Barrel Democracy Has Failed Time and Again," Commentary, *Los Angeles Times*, February 4, 2004.

[16] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 3.

Democratic consolidation:[17]

"Attitude: a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces."

"Behavior: a democratic regime…is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state."

"Constitution: a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process."

In this monograph, I make the argument that the modern consolidated democracy is not simply a regime that spontaneously emerges from a brief regime change activity or effort. It is a complex adaptive system dependent on certain subsystems, or preconditions, to become a viable and sustainable form of governance. These subsystems are represented by the five interrelated arenas of civil society, political society, rule of law, the state apparatus, and economic society. None of these arenas can function properly without the support of one or more of the other arenas and each are affected to a certain degree by the client country's nationalism, previous regime-type, and path to transition. The path-dependent democratization model accounts for the complex and interactive relationship of the arenas, more importantly it illustrates how and why a country's democratization is likely to fail under a counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach.

This monograph also seeks to build upon the body of knowledge concerning the causal relationship proposed by the path-dependent approach of democratic transition and consolidation. Specifically, the potential a country has for successful democratization considering its interrelation of nation, state, and democracy, its prior regime type, its path of transition, and its preconditions. First, this monograph will explain the theories of the counterinsurgency / lines of

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[17] Ibid, 4.

effort approach and path-dependent models. Second, this monograph will seek to discern the validity and advantages of each framework in the context of the two United States' occupations of Haiti. Finally, this monograph will suggest areas of future study and improvement applicable to each framework and their implications on future stability operations.

Chapter Two - Theory

The Democratic Environment

Democracy is based on consensus, consensus is expressed by voting, voting is a right of the citizen, citizenship is certified by the state, statehood is largely dependent on nationalism, and nationalism is affected by the degree of a state's ethnic, cultural, and linguistic similarities. Ignoring or avoiding the interrelated complexities of a country's existing sensibilities, particular those of its statehood, nationalism, and inherent anti-democratic tendencies during its democratic transition and consolidation is a recipe for failure. These complexities illustrate why facilitating elections, influencing economic reforms, and reforming institutions overwhelms the counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach resulting in its failure to shape an authentic and sustainable democratic transition and consolidation.

Stability-Operations Approach to Democratization

The United States military continues investing a tremendous amount of effort and resources into a counterinsurgency / line of effort framework in stability operations and democratization despite its paltry record of achievement. The idealistic expectation in the use of this approach is an ambiguous probability for success, but the realistic expectation is yet another failed attempt at democratization, the creation of the prerequisites of an insurgency, or both. The United States is wedded to this approach because of its failures at identifying the true causes of its results, the ideological dissonance of forcing democracy resulting in flawed national and military

strategies, and the downstream effect these flawed strategies have in shaping a counterinsurgency approach to democratization.

The United States' "learning" from past attempts in stability operations seem cognitively stuck in the purgatory of misidentifying the causes of its successes and failures. The experience with stability operations described by its military doctrine identifies early 20th Century stability operations failures in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua being caused by armed irregular opposition from the local populace preventing the establishment of effective constitutional governments.[18] Conversely, its military doctrine lists the occupations of Germany and Japan following World War II as the models for modern post-conflict stability operations.[19]

In a stunning example of irony and understatement, American military doctrine establishes historical context for stability operations by cherry-picking from our history absent of any context. The pre-conflict environments and intervention characteristics chosen in our doctrinal examples of success and failure in stability operations are indicative of the cognitive dissonance the United States has about exporting democracy. This cognitive impediment is displayed in our flawed national and military strategies regarding stability operations and consequently our continued practice of an approach that lacks quantifiable levels of validity.

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States focused economic aid on bolstering the economies and security of recipient countries believing that once their citizens started enjoying prosperity, democracy would automatically follow and another World War could be averted.[20] Then communism started gaining traction in the 1960s and the United States added political development as a focus for economic aid; again in the hope that democratic behavior

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[18] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2008) paragraph 1-5.

[19] Ibid, paragraph 1-6.

[20] Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve,* 19.

would induce democratic ideals.[21] In the 1970s, as the United States increasingly questioned its role in the Vietnam War, traction for the promotion of democracy dwindled. Newly elected President Reagan reinvigorated the promotion of democratization during a speech to the British Parliament in 1982 by introducing his foreign policy as:

"The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means."[22]

Here, the obvious ideological dissonance occurring is that of a country influencing (or imposing upon) another to transition to a self-determining form of governance like democracy. The less obvious ideological inconsistency is the United States' tendency to address democratization as the shaping of an environment where democratic behaviors are protected rather than developing democratic attitudes and beliefs; it is a tendency well-documented in our national strategies. The first essential task that is listed in the United States' National Security Strategy (NSS, 2006), charges the United States to champion aspirations for human dignity by ending tyranny and promoting effective democracies. It defines effective democracies as those that honor and uphold basic human rights, are responsive to their citizens, maintain sovereign borders and internal order, limit the reach of government, and protect their economy. The NSS goes on to develop those five characteristics in a manner similar to the preconditions of democratic consolidation espoused by the path-dependent model.

However, the next paragraph of the NSS highlights the key difference between the two approaches; it claims that political, religious, and economic freedoms are the objectives. It posits the assumption that freedom and prosperity will compel the citizens of a country to insist on

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[21] Ibid, 20, 28.

[22] Ibid, 31.

having control of their political fate. Furthermore, that popular elections and the institutional protection of human liberties symbolize a truly free society. The common theme: protecting democratic behavior prompts the emergence of democratic attitudes and ideals. The United States' record on exporting democracy fails to support this assertion and clearly displays a flawed strategy in harnessing behavior to form ideals rather than the opposite.

The conflicting ideology found in our national policies becomes more pronounced in our military strategy as evidenced by our doctrine. Specifically, the Joint and Army publications related to counterinsurgency and stability operations respectively.[23] Our doctrine describes both operations being political in nature and occurring in a fragile state; a fragile state is defined as one that is failing, failed, or recovering. Doctrine claims the instability in fragile states is due to their institutional weaknesses as a function of their populations' perception of their governments' legitimacy and effectiveness. Legitimate governments are defined as possessing four factors:

1. mandate: representative of the peoples will
2. manner: upholding human rights
3. consent: a pact between the government and governed
4. expectation: population's general satisfaction and overall lack of grievances

Thus, doctrine argues that the center of gravity for these operations is the population; however the guidance it provides is essentially protecting governmental legitimization efforts regardless of its levels of mandate, manner, consent, and expectation management. Doctrine does recognize that nations are different so it advises commanders to take into consideration a particular state's path and direction towards recovery during operational planning and execution.

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[23] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations,* Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009); U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2008).

Yet, both COIN and stability doctrine use operational frameworks (and paths) that are effectively identical in approach. The first phase to a counterinsurgency is clear which is similar to stability's initial response. The second phase in counterinsurgency is hold which is similar to stability's conflict transformation. The final phase in counterinsurgency is build which is similar to stability's building capacity.

The major difference in the United States' counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine is in their primary objective and the associated implications of those objectives. The primary objective in counterinsurgency is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.[24] The primary objective in stability operations is to support whole of government objectives in ensuring a stable and lasting peace.[25] Although the primary objectives are different, they both indentify and target similar factors. The factors identified in insurgencies are vulnerable populations, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control.[26] The factors identified in instability are grievances, key actors' motivations and means, and windows of vulnerability.[27]

The implication of the different primary objectives could be explained by the different assumptions they infer about the fragile state's government. Counterinsurgency doctrine infers the government's sole legitimacy vulnerability is the perception of its population regarding their expectation that the government provides protection and rule of law. Stability doctrine infers all four factors of the government's legitimacy (mandate, manner, consent, and expectation) are vulnerable. Stability doctrine's five lines of five lines of effort: civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, and economic/institutional control address three of the four

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[24] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3-24, XV.

[25] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07, paragraphs 1-77, 1-78.

[26] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication 3-24, XXIII.

[27] U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07, paragraph D-36.

factors. It addresses mandate by holding popular elections but these may be superficial because they are conducted according to a Western template rather than a pact between the governments and governed. It addresses manner by advising military forces to set the example but this effort suffers when the population suffers collateral damage from stabilization forces. Finally, it addresses expectation to the extent possible but largely ignores consent: the pact between the government and governed.

The failure of addressing the consent requisite in producing a legitimate government that has the potential to ensure a lasting and stable peace is caused by our conflicting national and military strategies. A government lacking a pact with its population is destined to eventually experience a vulnerable population with grievances from which one or more leaders will emerge that will seek to exploit opportunities to subvert the government. Whether the end result is coined an insurgency or instability the primary objectives of producing a legitimate government that has the potential to ensure a lasting and stable peace are not possible.

Path-Dependent Approach to Democratization

The premise of the path-dependent approach to democratization is that a country's success in achieving a democratic form of governance largely depends on the manner in which it embarks on such a journey. A reductionist interpretation of this approach would be that the success of someone travelling from one city to another is not ensured solely by their desire, much less someone else's desire. That person needs to know where his trip starts, his travel propensities, his route and the plans he must make, and any follow-up activities necessary to ensure he is successful. There are many more factors than his desire and the same holds true for democratization. Professors Juan Linz of Yale University and Alfred Stepan of Columbia University, developed a model that assesses the factors of *stateness*, prior regime-type, paths available, and preconditions to democratic transitions and consolidations that provide an "itinerary" for countries seeking democratization. This path-dependent approach hints at

"destinations" some "travelers" will find unattainable and suggests other "destinations" best suited to the "traveler". Its value is in protecting scarce resources from quantifiably doubtful efforts and maximizing the rewarded use of those resources in efforts worth the risk.

Independent Variable #1: *Stateness*

Democracy is a form of governance that requires a functional state in order to succeed. *Stateness* is the inter-relationship of a country's existing values on the concepts of state, nation, and democracy.[28] The idea of *Stateness* encompasses the common definitions of all three concepts, to include the state as an organization formed to govern a population, the nation as an identity people assume in relation to their interactions with other people, and democracy as a form of governance that requires complementary perspectives of state and nation. The more a country's values about state and nation conflict, the more difficult it will find the path to democratization.

It is important to note that state-building is not synonymous to nation-building, as the following examples will illustrate. The immediate aftermath of World War II introduced the division of one nation-state, Germany, into one nation living as two states; each with a form of government that approximated the polar opposite of the other. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the two states were reunited into one nation-state amidst much fanfare, relatively few difficulties, and most notably an enduring form of government that was the more autonomous of the two. Conversely, we find Iraq to display a state whose existence is threatened because of its multiple nations. Delving into the identities of those nations quickly identifies the veritable complexity of their problem. The Iraqi state is comprised of an Islamic-nation majority and a large Kurdish-nation minority, with the latter wanting sovereignty as a nation-state. The Muslims identify with an Islamic state but also identify with their respective Sunni and Shiite nations, each

[28] Ibid, 7.

believing the state is legitimate only if they control it. Despite a tremendous invest of resources and personal sacrifice by all parties involved, an enduring and democratic form of governance is all but guaranteed.

These examples illustrate the conflict in reasoning that occurs when one country occupies another to promote democracy. It is a rare occasion when an occupied state achieves legitimacy because it will invariably suffer the input of a voice that does not belong to the population; that of the occupier who imposes their voice and vote in the state's domestic affairs. Regardless of the occupier's benevolence and purity of intentions, the effect is the same; the occupier will influence the development of the preconditions necessary for democratization during intervention and extrication. These foreign influences add further complexities to a situation that is already inherently complex. The issue of sovereignty entails both the borders of the state and that of the nation(s).

Irredenta created by the arbitrary delineation of borders or simple migration add another conflict in the relationship of states, nations, and democracy. They have the ability to pressure the government having authority over their territory as well as the government they culturally identify with most closely. The host government inherits a dual threat, both internal and external, due to these irredenta. Ethnicity and culture are significant influences on the attitudes, beliefs, and thinking of a population; consequently, a country must consider these values when deciding on a path that enables their population to internalize democratic thinking.

States composed of heterogeneous nations will also find the transition to democracy difficult because of the conflicting values of nation and state inherent to their society. They find the transition even more difficult when they have a generally accepted nationalistic identity and yet deny certain enclaves within it the rights and liberties of citizenship.[29] This is not to suggest

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[29] Ibid, 28-33.

that a multinational state cannot achieve democracy, it simply suggests that the relationship between the beliefs and values of the state, nation, and democracy are a significant consideration to countries seeking democratic transition and consolidation. It is equally important for countries that seek to export democracy. Figure 2-1 below illustrates the interactions and most likely consequences of these preexisting value-sets.

With its homogenous culture and strong national identity, Haiti does not have the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic baggage faced by many other countries seeking democratization. Its history of denying certain strata of its society their rights due to identity conflicts explored in the second case study are an undeniable hurdle it must overcome to achieve democratization; however, such a hurdle is vastly simpler to overcome than those of a multinational state. Haiti does have the potential of developing the complementary values in the state and nation necessary for successful democratization.



Figure 1: created by the author of this monograph as a summary of Linz & Stepan's *Stateness* levels.

Independent Variable #2: Character of the Previous Regime

Since the early 1960s, political regimes have generally been classified along a spectrum that spans from democracy at one extremity, totalitarianism at the other, and authoritarianism floating somewhere in between. Authoritarianism stands out from the two polemics because it simultaneously displays democratic and totalitarian tendencies including limited pluralism, lack of ideology, distinctive mentality, and weak political mobilization. Most political science researchers agree that post-Stalinist Soviet regimes started straying from totalitarianism shortly after Stalin's death, while others disagree with the wholesale labeling of such regimes as being under the authoritarian umbrella. Those in opposition argue that there exist sufficient differences

in pluralism, ideology, mentality, and mobilization in so-called authoritarian regimes that two other distinct regime-types emerge: in post-totalitarianism and sultanism.[30]

Post-totalitarian regimes are distinct in that they have a weak political leader but strong political party, or vice versa. The sacredness of the one entity is typically a remnant of their totalitarian forays, while the weak entity is typically one of the main causes for the country's break from totalitarianism. Another distinction found in post-totalitarian regimes is their hybrid ideology. Their mobilization neither resembles that which is based on the utopian quest typical of totalitarian regimes, nor that which is characterized by the technical nature typical of Authoritarian regimes. Post-totalitarian regimes also demonstrate more pluralistic tendencies than totalitarian regimes but significantly less pluralism than authoritarian regimes. These differences shape the civil, political, and economic societies into semi-autonomous arenas that typically seek to replace the existing political model for one with equally totalitarian tendencies rather than more democratic ones.[31]

Sultanistic regimes typify much of Haiti's political history. They differ from totalitarianism by lacking a genuine ideology but also differ from authoritarianism in that they lack technocratic tendencies. The whims of the Sultan usually fill whatever space existed for ideology, with the term *Sultan* meaning ruler and devoid of any religious implications. Another difference from the other non-democratic regimes is the strong fusion of public and private dimensions, again subject to the whims of the Sultan. These regimes may severely repress certain aspects of society while ignoring others. The will of the Sultan, often erratic and meaningless, is the only mobilization that guides the country where and how the ruler pleases. These differences

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[30] Ibid, 19.

[31] Ibid, 42-50.

create an environment where there is an extreme absence in rule of law or opposition to the regime, and perpetually weakened state institutions. [32]

The variety in the characteristics of non-democratic regimes are significant, particularly the conditions of their pluralism, ideologies, mobilization, and leadership. Figure 2-2 below provides a template that facilitates comparing and contrasting the representative characteristics typical among the major modern regimes, including democratic regimes. The characteristics of these regimes are significant because they suggest what paths are available to them when seeking their populations' internalization of democratic principles, democratic thinking, and democratic attitudes. The differences in characteristics are also significant in that they begin hinting at the short-comings of a counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization.

The independent variables of *Stateness* and regime characteristics provide us with sufficient material from which to construct at least half of the mission statement that should replace the counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization. This construct would read:

What are the implications of a country's inherent values and beliefs, with reference to its levels of Stateness and prior regime type, on the potential for its democratic transition and consolidation?

We will now explore the dependent variables of the framework, the available paths to democratic transition and the preconditions for democratic consolidation, as well as refining the proposed replacement to the counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization.

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[32] Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 23-25.



Figure 2: created by the author as a summary of Linz & Stepan's prior regime characteristics.

This discussion on the independent variables of *Stateness* and regime characteristics provides us with a better appreciation for the wide variation in one country's experience with democratization compared to another. Each independent variable must contend with its own set of subordinate variables, which in turn will be affected by its own set of fluctuating influences and circumstances thus creating complex adaptive systems of their own accord. These systems form the environment that countries face when developing and, at times possibly creating, the five arenas that are fundamentally necessary for sustainable democracy; however, the country must first transition to democracy. The path to democratic transition is the first of the two dependent variables; the second is comprised of five preconditions to democracy including civil society, political society, rule of law, state institutions, and economic society. The key difference between

the path-dependent and the counterinsurgency / line of effort approaches to democratization is that the former focuses on democratic thoughts and attitudes, whereas the counterinsurgency / line of effort approach focuses on protecting democratic behavior by developing democratic institutions in the hope that the behavior will eventually cultivate the thinking.

Dependent Variable #1: Available Path to Democratic Transition

The path towards a consolidated democracy is not the same for Russia as it is for Haiti. Nor, is the path towards a consolidated democracy the same for Somalia as it is for Haiti, though some would assume it to be. A rudimentary analysis and comparison of the *Stateness* and prior-regime types of Somalia and Haiti would prove the reasons why. In terms of *Stateness*, though they have similar racial compositions, Somalia's clan system makes it a more heterogeneous nation than Haiti. They also differ in that Somalia's Muslim population produces a larger militant and culturally diverse population. In terms of economy, Somalia's development is greater than 2/3 of the countries in Africa; Haiti is the least developed country in the western hemisphere. In terms of prior regime type, they both lead the list of failed states in their respective hemispheres but for different reasons. Somalia's history of governance displays totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and authoritarian tendencies; Haiti's history of governance largely displays sultanistic tendencies.[33] Thus, the reason their respective paths to democratization are different is due to their differences in *Stateness* and prior regime-types of the two countries despite all the other similarities they share.

Summarized in figure 2-3 below are seven paths that countries may find available to them when seeking democratic transition. Four of these paths are applicable to regimes in general, and

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[33] Freedom House, *Country Report: Haiti,* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, Inc., 2009), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2009&country=7621 (accessed April 24, 2010); Freedom House, *Country Report: Somalia.* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, Inc., 2007), *http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7273* (accessed April 24, 2010).

three of these paths are regime-type centric because they apply to the specific context of the regime's characteristics. The four general paths are reform pacts, defeat by war, interim government resulting from a coup, and military juntas extricating themselves from rule. The three regime-specific paths are leadership crisis, eroding support base, and domestic issues.[34]



Figure 3: created by the author as a summary of Linz & Stepan's paths to democratic transition.

The counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization prescribes only one path to democracy: isolate the bad guys, establish elections, and develop institutions. In general, this approach simply seeks to enable and protect democratic behavior; therefore, it views variations in the environment and history as peripheral issues. That is not to say that individuals

[34] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 56-64.

and organizations carrying out this approach do not have an appreciation for the variations in the environment or history of host countries, this simply implies that the model does not provide a framework that unifies efforts contending with these differences. If we accept, the often-repeated description of democracy, attributed to Abraham Lincoln during his Gettysburg Address, entailing a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, the path to democracy must emerge from a population rather than thrust upon it. Democracy in the United States is different from that of Europe as well as their elections, economies, and institutions. Although they have different methods of accomplishing these activities and operating the associated institutions, they share fundamental similarities in their democratic principles.

The different methods stem from the choices of their respective citizens and are internalized by their citizens precisely because they were part of the process that chose and developed them. The conflicting values and beliefs introduced earlier in our discussion, in the areas of *Stateness* and occupiers developing a country's democracy, are present here as well. Occupiers usually chose the form(s) of elections, economy, and institutions a country will have, or they empower a representative minority that chooses them. In either situation, whether real or perceived, the population will feel excluded and the entire effort seen as illegitimate. With this brought to light, the crucial task at hand is not to assist a country to act democratically in the hope that they will eventually learn to think democratically. Instead it is assisting them in learning how to think democratically, then allowing them the freedom of maneuver to choose how to implement a form of governance that aligns with their democratic principles. In order to identify the path, we must first identify the fundamental arenas where democratic thinking occurs. The second dependent variable of this framework identifies five principles that serve as the preconditions to democracy and foundational elements of democratic society.

Dependent Variable # 2: Preconditions for the Consolidation of Democracy

The five preconditions (or arenas) to democratic consolidation are civil society, political society, rule of law, state institutions, and economic society. Although they seem like a carbon copy of the counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach, they are different in that they seek to induce democratic thinking not democratic behavior. They also differ from the counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach by representing a gate that must be met in order for a host country's polity to internalize democratic attitudes, behaviors, and constitution rather than the objective itself. Figure 3-4 below presents the affect the different regime types have on the five preconditions to democracy.

Civil society entails the freedom of choice citizens exercise when creating self-organized groups, associations, or movements independent from the state which reflect their values and interests rather than those of the state. This freedom of choice includes a citizen's right to refuse to join these groups and to remain an independent entity that may join other such individuals in spontaneous, unorganized protests against government actions. Though typically small in number during their initial protests, as their group's movement gains momentum, they may leverage sufficient pressure against the regime to either gain concessions addressing their grievances or serve as a catalyst for regime change. In essence, the citizenry's freedom to voice grievances through organized or disorganized public discourse is a mechanism that helps galvanize public opinion and attitudes through largely non-violent conflict resolution.[35]

Whereas civil society is a mechanism that galvanizes and consolidates the will of the citizenry, political society is a mechanism whereby the citizenry's will shapes the nature of the state's form of governance. Civil and political societies are related in that they are both shaped by the same freedoms of public discourse and self-organizing groups, yet are markedly different.

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[35] Ibid, 7-8.

Civil society enables the creation and agreement of broad societal objectives while political society develops the governmental framework that best represents those objectives. Unfortunately, transitional democracies sometimes confuse them as similar movements thus creating false dichotomies where one can exist only at the expense of the other. A cursory review of modern democracies clearly indicates that those where both societies are vibrant and active have healthier democracies, and those that do not reflect the opposite.[36]

Rule of law expresses that the environment that guarantees the citizenry's freedom to self-organize and engage in public discourse is the foundational elements of civil and political societies. Typically, a state's constitution represents and formalizes the spirit, characteristics, and boundaries of this environment. It is a contract between civil and political societies and a critical component of democratic consolidation requiring more than just a majority vote. It also requires a strong consensus that binds temporarily advantaged factions to behaviors that elevate certain societal interests above their own. An effective rule of law also requires an independent judicial system that can interpret and arbitrate conflicts arising from the legal framework establishing this social contract.[37]

The state apparatus enforces the rule of law through the monopoly of violence, requiring the state to maintain law and order by providing a judicial mechanism such as fielding police forces as well as providing basic services. The resources needed to implement these measures require the state to develop a capacity to raise and manage funds, typically in the form of taxes. This arena carries the potential to derail the consolidation of democracy by producing grievances from various societal enclaves based on their perception of inequitable treatment, whether actual or not. Indeed, unless the arenas of civil society, political society, and rule of law emerge from a

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[36] Ibid, 8-9.

[37] Ibid, 10.

vigorous public discourse and vetting process, both the reality and perception of discriminatory governance increase.[38]

Raising revenue, providing services, and a natural extension of rule of law principles to economic affairs decisively force the government into the marketplace. Economic history has shown that the extreme forms of market, non-wartime command economies or purely free market economies, do not lend themselves to a consolidated democracy. The former favors the ruling class at the expense of the mercantilist and indigent classes, as the latter favors the mercantilist class over the two others. Just as the rule of law empowers all classes of the society to have a civil and political voice, government regulation of the marketplace empowers all citizens of a consolidated democracy to have a voice in the marketplace. The societal expectations of government assistance during extraordinary circumstances, regardless of their nature, also force the government to establish regulations that seek to minimize the potential and/or scale of such circumstances.[39]

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[38] Ibid, 11.

[39] Ibid, 11-13.



Figure 4: created by the author as a summary of Linz & Stepan's democratic arenas.

A consolidated democracy occurs only after a society transitions to sustainable democratic attitudes and beliefs.[40] Having explored the effect of nationalism, political history, paths available, and preconditions that a state must contend with on its quest for democratic transition and consolidation, we can complete our mission statement. The construct of our approach when seeking to assist such a democracy-seeking state would now read:

"What path should Country A take in order to achieve the five preconditions that will enable it to internalize the attitudinal, behavioral, and constitutional dimensions of democracy, given its history, Stateness, and current political system?"

[40] Ibid, 6.

This is the question I will seek to answer during the following case studies on the United States' occupations of Haiti. Technically, the United States invaded Haiti with the goal of influencing its domestic political affairs in 1915, 1994, and 2004. Since the latter two occupations both relate to former President Aristide, they will be combined into one case study. The goal is to analyze the intentions, actions, and results of the United States during these occupations in an attempt to validate the framework developed by Linz & Stepan in the hope that it may assist current international efforts in rebuilding Haiti. Peripherally, but equally important, adding to the existing body of knowledge encompassing the application of this framework in the hope that it proves itself as a worthwhile replacement to the counterinsurgency / line of effort approach to democratization.


Independent Variable #1
Independent Variable #2
Level of Ethnic Diversity
Logic of the Nation
Logic of the State
STATENESS
Level of Cultural Diversity
Level of Sovereignty
Totalitarianism
Non-Democratic Regime Types
Sultanism
Post-Totalitarianism
Authoritarianism
Reform Pact
Regime Specific
Defeat in War
Transition Paths
Military Junta
Interim Regime
Dependent Variables
Civil Arena
Economic Arena
Political Arena
Consolidation Prerequisites
State
Rule of Law
Attitudes
Sustainable Democracy
Beliefs
Constitution

Chapter Three - Case Studies

United States Intervention in Haiti, 1915-1934

The Environment

In 1804, after nearly 15 years of revolution, Haitian slaves of African origin won their independence from their French slave masters.[41] The United States had provided the revolutionary slaves with military and financial support due to its fears of France establishing a colony in Louisiana to hinder, if not entirely blockade, American trade at the Port of New Orleans. Indeed, France's pending loss of Haiti provided it with the final impetus to complete ongoing negotiations with the United States for the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.[42]

Ironically, the United States' domestic and foreign agendas at the time prompted it to refuse granting Haiti diplomatic recognition until 1864. Domestically, as the era's only free black republic, Haiti was an issue that generated strong political pressure from American plantation owners who feared their slaves would follow the Haitian example.[43] Additionally, the economic benefits the United States enjoyed from its rapprochement with Britain urged America to do the same with France to the point of joining France's embargo against Haiti. The irony was not lost on the newly formed nation-state and would only serve to reinforce the sense of nationalism it had formed as a slave-state.

Finally, Haiti came to the realization that it needed to make peace with France if it wanted to subsist on the world stage.[44] In 1825, after more than a decade of negotiations, Haiti

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[41] John E. Fagg, *Cuba, Haiti, & the Dominican Republic* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 120, 125.

[42] Rayford W. Logan, *The DiplomaticRelations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1930), 114.

[43] Ibid, 79.

[44] Robert D. Heinl, Nancy G. Heinl, and Michael Heinl, *Written in blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 148.

and France settled on a conditional agreement that worked towards the recognition of Haiti's independence. The agreement was actually a royal edict presented to Haiti by two French admirals backed by every French man-of-war in the Caribbean, 494 in total. The terms gave France the collection of a 150-million francs indemnity receivable in five years and a 50% tariff preference.[45] Upset but powerless to do anything about it, the Haitian government accepted the terms. Haiti was free but still enslaved by its French masters, a factor that would also weigh heavily in the development of its sense of state.

At the turn of the 19th Century, the United States came to the realization that European trade ambitions and increasing competition in the lucrative Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) colonies were a threat to its national security. The American solution to this perceived existential threat was President James Monroe's introducing his foreign policy, known as the *Monroe Doctrine*, during his annual address to Congress in 1823.[46] In it, he declared that European colonization efforts in the Western Hemisphere would be considered as acts of aggression by the United States. Over the next several decades, European powers continuously tested the United States' resolve in the *Monroe Doctrine* forcing the United States to conclude that naval bases in the LAC were an indispensable factor in establishing regional hegemony.

The strategic implications of naval bases in the LAC region were reinforced when the North used a naval base in Haiti during the United States' Civil War. They were further reinforced with continually increasing *Monroe Doctrine* concerns vis-à-vis the hostility that Britain, France, and Spain displayed towards America as it solidified its status as regional hegemon.[47] Combined, these tensions provided the United States with sufficient incentive to

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[45] Ibid, 162-163.

[46] Lester H. Brune, *The Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations Volume I*, 149.

[47] Spain claiming the annexation of and occupying the Dominican Republic in 1861; French, British, and Spanish forces occupying Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1861; British politicians calling for the recognition of the Confederate States of America in 1862; French troops occupying Mexico City in 1863.

finally recognize Haiti in 1864.[48] The manner in which the United States managed its relationship of convenience with Haiti reinforced the smaller country's conflicting sense of state and nation, and on the American side it served as the foundation for its decision to later invade Haiti.

The United States' victory during the Spanish-American War in 1898 proved to the world that America was indeed committed to the *Monroe Doctrine*. More importantly, it established the United States as a global superpower with unquestionable regional hegemony. It also reinforced American beliefs about the strategic importance in having naval bases in the LAC region and an Isthmian Passage connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific. The 1898 Treaty of Paris ceded control of the Philippines and Guam to the United States and also gave it naval bases in Puerto Rico and Cuba.[49]

The resulting strategic gain for the United States was the ability to project naval power along the three major trade routes in the Caribbean: the Windward, Mona, and Anegada Passages. The Windward Passage runs between Cuba and Haiti, the Mona Passage runs between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, and the Anegada runs adjacent to Dutch St. Thomas just east of Puerto Rico. In the mid-1800s, the United States had originally shown interest in permanently acquiring ports at Haiti's Mole St. Nicholas, the Dominican Republic's Samana Bay, or Denmark's St. Thomas.[50] Given that their 1898 Treaty of Paris acquisitions gave the United States adequate overwatch of the two western trade routes, their interest in Mole St. Nicholas and Samana waned. However, the United States realized they would have to deny other world powers

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[48] Rayford W. Logan, The diplomatic relations of the United States with Haiti, 1776-1891, 300.

[49] Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 105, 132-134.

[50] Ludwell L. Mintague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1940), 94.

the ability to establish themselves at those ports, so their efforts leaned more towards ensuring the two island-countries' naval bases were kept off the market.[51]

In addition to its strategic importance, the LAC also held economic importance. In 1911, 65-70% of goods arriving in Haiti were from North America. German and French businessmen accounted for nearly 80% of the trade in Haiti's principal cities, and the German-owned Hamburg America Line hauled nearly 75% of the trade destined to and from Haiti.[52] Local French merchants had returned to Haiti engaging in coup-financing but were soon joined by German merchants whom were attracted to the generous revenues. These merchants had a twofold motivation in financing revolutions, they could profit from the loans they made and also provoke rebels into looting their stores so they could later make claims on the government. As the frequency of revolutions increased, corporate investment increased as well, as did the interest rates paid by the Haitian government. Estimates place Haitian debt on the eve of the invasion at $118 million[53] consuming approximately of 80% of government revenues in debt service alone.[54]

These corporate investors were comprised of French and German firms until a scandal in Haiti's National Bank in 1910 resulted in a reorganization that opened the door to American investors. Most notable among American investment firms was the National City Bank of New York, and most notable among the individuals representing that firm was its vice-president Roger L. Farnham. While accounts of time frames vary it is generally accepted that circa 1910 Farnham was National City Bank's VP, an advisor to Haiti's National Bank, and the most trusted advisor

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[51] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 56.

[52] Gayle Plummer, "The Metropolitan Connection: Foreign and Semi-foreign Elites in Haiti, 1900-1915." *Latin American Research Review* 19:2 (1984), 121-122.

[53] Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 100 (1922),* 155.

[54] Arthur C. Millspaugh and World Peace Foundation, *Haiti under American control, 1915-1930* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931), 18.

on Haitian affairs to American Secretary of State Jennings. Farnham used his position to manipulate American fears about Germany gaining control of Haiti, American military commitment and posture in the region, Haitian fears about America establishing a customs receivership similar to that emplaced in the Dominican Republic, and Haitian government financial needs against each other to generate business for his firm. Henry W. Furniss, the American Minister to Haiti, reported Farnham's duplicitous behavior but was promptly recalled by the State Department. Reportedly, Farnham's influence over Secretary Jennings was so great that he was able to convince Jennings that Furniss was hostile towards American interests in Haiti.[55] It is difficult to imagine any single individual having had a greater affect in inciting the fears of President Wilson and Secretary Jennings and their decision to order the invasion of Haiti in 1915.

Haitian Stateness

At the turn of the 20th Century, Haitian culture prominently reflected the fact that its sense of nationalism remained virtually unchanged since having gained its independence. Though its population was almost entirely homogenous with over 90% African ethnic representation and only single digit percentages of European ethnic representation, the delineation was stark. The majority of the educated and upper-classes were populated with citizens of European ethnicity who preferred speaking French rather than Creole, the local patois, and had an unabashed affinity for all things of European origin. They sent their children to school abroad, had teams of servants, and treated lower classes of Haitians as lesser citizens. Although both groups identified with their Haitian nationality, none of them doubted the existence of a caste system composed of two groups: the lighter skinned haves and the darker skinned haves-not.[56]

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[55] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti,* 1915-1934, 48-57.

[56] Ibid, 20-22.

The Haitian rationalization of state rule through revolution also survived their first century of independence virtually unscathed; it was a period during which it cycled through 20 heads of state. Of those 11 were overthrown, four died in office of natural causes, three died in office of unspecified unnatural causes, and only two served their full terms. In the five-year period preceding its 1915 invasion by the United States, Haiti cycled through six different heads of state effectively averaging a change of government every 10 months.[57] Haiti's conflicting sense of dualistic-nationalism imbedded with strong militancy combined with leadership that varied between weak and nonexistent, created an environment where a democratic transition and consolidation held extremely slim possibilities at best.

Haiti's Prior Regimes

As American and European trade activities in the LAC region grew, American and European tensions grew accordingly. Without much fanfare, European monarchs accepted their role of decreasing influence in the Western Hemisphere as America became increasingly powerful. Nonetheless, they continued exploiting trade opportunities where they could. Haiti's massacring of white European slave masters during its fight for independence failed to deter American and British mercantilists. Although they were shocked at the events on Hispaniola, they failed to identify with French planters and leaped at the opportunity to fill the void left by fleeing Frenchmen.[58] The opportunism exercised by these merchants when dealing with Haitian rulers, regardless of the domestic strife it caused in Haiti, served as an accelerant to an already volatile environment. Early in Haitian history, its rulers realized that the likelihood that they would rule for any significant period of time was virtually non-existent. The standard template for regimes

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[57] Embassy of Haiti in Washington, D.C., "List of Haitian Heads of State," Embassy of Haiti, http://www.haiti.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=67&catid=56&Itemid=114 (accessed August 6, 2009).

[58] Ludwell L. Mintague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938*, 44-46.

quickly became: get violent, get power, get rich, and get going; the quintessential sultanistic regime.

The United States' Plan

In July 1915, Haitian President Guillaume Sam and one of his generals sought refuge from mobs intent on killing them at the French and Dominican legations respectively. The mobs entered these legations, captured the president and his general, and dragged them into the streets where they were promptly executed. Fearing French and Dominican reaction to the violations of their sovereignty as well as the opportunity it gave them to assert their influence in Haiti, the United States deployed Marines to reestablish order the very same day. Within hours order was restored and within weeks United States forces were in control of all the government's agencies, including customs tariff-collecting agencies in the coastal towns. A Marine officer who was a veteran of other Banana Wars noted in his diary that in Cuba, American forces did not have the level of absolute authority they enjoyed in Haiti.

Despite having campaigned as a champion of self-determination and disparager of the *Monroe Doctrine*, President Wilson concluded that developments in World War I held the potential of requiring a prolonged occupation in Haiti. His Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, concurred and sought to justify the occupation through either precedence or international law but reported to the President that he was unable to do so. Secretly, both President Wilson and Secretary Lansing agreed that United States interests were best served by installing a mechanism that would allow the United States to control Haiti. Publicly, President Wilson announced his intention to retain military control until a strong and stable Haitian government was established and fortunately for him events during World War I diverted political attention from the crisis.[59]

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[59] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 70.

The plan was quite simply an extension of American regional hegemonic policies under the pretext of establishing law and order to protect American lives and property. The only missing ingredient was a revolution, for Haiti it was simply a matter of time measured in months rather than years. That ingredient was introduced in July 1915, as Haitian President Guillaume Sam in office for only five months was killed by an enraged mob because of reports that he had massacred 167 political prisoners.[60]

The Arenas

Civil Society:

That on the eve of its independence Haiti had not developed a level of civil society worth mentioning is a foregone conclusion given their status of slaves newly liberated through violent revolution. However, when American forces arrived more than a century later, in 1915, they were shocked by the lack of progress found in Haitian society, much less its civil society. They found a country with an estimated 92% illiteracy rate, a dysfunctional political system, rule of law characterized largely by might instead of rights, and an economic system based largely on graft.[61] At the time, Haitians were consumed with struggling for the basic necessities required to sustain daily life and didn't seem overly concerned with developing as a nation.[62] Sultanistic regime arenas typically have low levels of development and require special attention by an intervening country if it hopes to develop democratic thinking in the host country's polity. The only freedom of choice Haitian's exercised when creating self-organized groups, associations, or movements independent from the state was when they rebelled against the state. Their sense of civil society

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[60] Ibid, 65.

[61] Raymond W. Logan, "Education in Haiti," *The Journal of Negro History* 15:4 (1930), 434.

[62] Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 100 (1922)*, 148.

was based on violent conflict resolution that had not evolved from their days of slavery in the late 18th century and the occupation did little to change it.

Late in 1916, when American wives and families were allowed to join their husbands in Haiti, the racial harmony that had existed came to an end. Jim Crow segregation and the taboo against social interaction between white woman and anyone with black blood were introduced in Haiti. The fact that American men openly had Haitian mistresses further exacerbated the situation.[63] Also, shortly after their arrival, Marines reintroduced the *corvee* system which was essentially forced labor approximating slavery to develop Haiti's infrastructure. Though the infrastructure building was one of the heralded successes of the occupation, it simply reinforced Haiti's already conflicting sense of state and nationalism. The *corvee* system was eventually abolished in 1918 due to the frictions it created between the occupiers and occupied.[64]

Political Society:

The nature of Haitian society's galvanization and consolidation is reflected in how they shaped their state's form of governance. Though their civil and political societies share a similar nature in that they were limited and approached public discourse through cyclical, self-organized group violence, the results were different. Their civil society failed to create or reach consensus on broad societal objectives and the sole emergent societal strategy to fill the void was survival. Consequently, the nature of the governmental framework developed by their political society was one of survival. Ironically, it was successful in that it reflected their emergent societal objective of survival but failed to evolve or even aspire to anything more. The observation is not made in

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[63] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 135-139.

[64] Emily G. Balch, Occupied Haiti: Being the report of a committee of six disinterested Americans representing organizations exclusively American, who, having personally studied conditions in Haiti in 1926, favor the restoration of the independence of the Negro republic (New York: Writers Publishing Company, 1927), 76.

jest, it highlights the fact that exporting democracy should primarily focus on attitudes and democratic thinking not just behaviors and institutions. Unfortunately, the United States focused almost exclusively on inducing the type of behavior that they thought would lead to Haitians internalizing democratic principles. Although these objectives were typically made with good intentions, they were implemented without consideration to winning hearts and minds much less imparting democratic values.

The actions of American military forces and State Department representatives in Haiti did little to help develop political society and democratic thinking during the occupation. Martial law was enforced nearly the entire occupation during which several hundred Haitians were tried in military tribunals for crimes considered detrimental to the occupation. Some of the accused were merely journalists exercising the freedom of press yet were promptly accused of inciting opposition to the occupation.[65] The senior military commander on the ground, Admiral William B. Caperton, blatantly manipulated Haitian presidential elections in 1915 in order to ensure Sudre Dartiguevave, the candidate he felt best represented the interests of the United States, was elected.[66] The America Chief of Mission in Haiti, Beale Davis, threatened and cajoled the Haitian President into signing a treaty authorizing the American occupation a week after it had occurred.[67] In June of 1917, then Major Smedley D. Butler prevented the ratification of a new constitution that the United States did not approve of by forcing the President to dissolve parliament, reportedly by way of physical threat.[68] The American High Commissioner from 1922-

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[65] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 74-75.

[66] Robert D. Heinl, Nancy G. Heinl, and Michael Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995*, 397-404.

[67] Ibid, 404-411.

[68] Ibid, 419-423.

1930, Brigadier General John H. Russell, manipulated elections to ensure the election of Louis Borno the second of three Haitian Presidents whom held office during the occupation.[69]

The manner in which the United States managed its leadership in Haiti also reinforced a fundamental flaw that had plagued Haiti's attempts at self-governance. During the first seven years of the occupation (1915-1922) the United States rotated six different Marine brigade commanders, six different gendarmerie commanders, and several different state department principles through their posts in Haiti.[70] The only example of consistency in leadership that the United States exhibited was General Russell in his assignment as High Commissioner in Haiti during eight of the last 12 years of the occupation (1922-1930). He was charged with oversight over all American personnel, military or civilian, who represented the United States Government in Haiti. Russell's leadership style was indisputably authoritarian and no official, whether American or Haitian, acted without his approval.[71] Elected at the same time that Russell was nominated High Commissioner, Haitian President Louis Borno appears to have been influenced by Russell's style and started displaying authoritarian tendencies as well.[72] These factors reinforced several values in Haitian political society that are contradictory to democracy, prominent among them was that frequent, arbitrary leadership changes were not an aberration and authoritarian rule was an enduring style of governance.

Rule of Law:

Prior to the invasion, Haiti did not have effective rule of law as a result of their civil and political discord. Their lack of civil and political compromise and harmony obstructed the strong,

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[69] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 124.

[70] Ibid, 117.

[71] Ibid, 124-129.

[72] Ibid, 128.

independent societal consensus that limits temporarily advantaged factions to behaviors that elevate societal interests above their own. Understandably, a country whose population transitioned from the status of property as slaves to that of the free citizens of a state will have a conceptual stance about rule of law that fails to meet levels favorable to democratic governance. Therefore, Haitians did not enjoy the protection of civil rights or the guarantees typically enjoyed by the citizens of a democracy. Protections and rights stemmed from who a citizen knew or those a citizen could afford, the actions of the United States reinforced this perception. As a sovereign country Haiti was forcibly occupied by a foreign country for essentially domestic matters during which the occupier's foreign rules and laws were imposed on its citizenry. Some of the measures imposed were considered illegal in the occupier's country, like the suppression of Haitian freedom of speech and press, yet the occupiers did so with impunity.[73] The occupiers also empowered individuals that represented their own interests rather than Haitian interests. These actions served to reinforce already deeply flawed values in rule of law.[74]

State Institutions:

As one might expect, Haiti's state institutions were underdeveloped and dysfunctional due to the lacking of societal consensus required for the development of their civil society, political society, and rule of law. The United States' professed mission was to restore a strong and stable government in Haiti but the path they chose doomed the mission to failure, most poignantly was the failure to have established even a superficially functioning government for reasons which are glaringly apparent. General Russell's authoritarian rule restricted Haitian leaders from being employed in positions of responsibility, shaped an adversarial relationship between the populace and the Haitian government as well as American forces, and suppressed the development of

[73] Emily G. Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, 163-166.

[74] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 195.

democratic institutions.[75] At one point Russell asked for extra Marines to carry out constructive work that may include modifying the constitution and drastically reforming the judicial system. American diplomats recalling Marine use of the *corvee* system and the tensions it created were able to convince the Secretary of the Navy to promptly deny the request.[76]

The manner in which the United States performed its mission in Haiti could easily be written off as characteristic of the racism prevalent during the era and the superiority complex typically attributed to Americans throughout its history.[77] Prior to taking his post as High Commissioner General Russell clearly showed such an attitude in a 1921 memorandum to the State Department. In it Russell declared "...the absurdity of dual control, or of two [countries] administering the affairs of a [single] country is too obvious to need comment. Two men can ride a horse but one must ride behind."[78] According to him, the United States should be the front rider or the United States should go home. So after 19 years of occupation, these woefully underdeveloped state institutions were on the cusp of becoming entirely dysfunctional due to the dependence they had developed on an external influence which would soon extricate itself from their system.

Economic Society:

Economic society was another arena developed with the furtherance of American interests trumping that of developing a sustainable democracy in Haiti. Within days of taking control of Haiti Admiral Caperton seized its custom houses which were by far the greatest source of revenue for the Haitian government. This was not an irregular act by a wayward Admiral. The

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[75] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), 27.

[76] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 188-190.

[77] Emily G. Balch, *Occupied Haiti*, 115-117.

[78] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 124.

United States had established precedence for getting involved in its protectorates economies since 1890 in a brand of foreign policy called *dollar diplomacy* by authors Scott Nearing and Joseph Freemen in 1925.[79]

The United States revised Haiti's tariff structure then proceeded to collect custom revenues and deposit them at the National Bank of Haiti on behalf of the Haitian government. An American financial advisor managed those funds by establishing a budget for the Haitian government, approving all disbursement of money, and scheduling the repayment of its financial obligations. These acts had the altruistic results of a tariff schedule that no longer exploited the poor, protected government funds from frivolous claims, restructured debt to terms more favorable to Haiti and repaid the debt in a timely manner. However, these acts also had detrimental results, primarily that the Haitian government did not have a say in its fiscal affairs thus did not learn to act democratically much less think democratically as the freedom to execute basic services was withheld from them, albeit for good reason. Also, the United States withheld government payrolls to pressure the government at will, and paid American personnel including Marines for the advisory services they obliged the Haitians to accept. Indeed, 13% of the Haitian government's personnel expenditures went to Americans who were also drawing a salary from their American employers including the Federal Government.[80]

American private firms branched out from the banking industry and invested in other sectors of the Haitian economy as well. Two of the most successful of these firms were the United Fruit Company and the General Sugar Company. United Fruit, which later became United Brands and is known today as Chiquita Brands International, is credited as being the source for the term *Banana Wars*. United was so successful in Haiti that they exploited the graft system and

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[79] Paul W. Drake, *Money Doctors, Foreign Debts, and Economic Reforms in Latin America from the 1890s to the Present* (Wilmington: SR Books, 1993), 3-23.

[80] Ibid, 29-34.

the abundant pool of laborers in Haiti to migrate an estimated 20,000 Haitian laborers to Cuba as a source of cheap labor to work plantations.[81] The tensions produced by the management of its budget, exploitation of its labor pool, meltdown in coffee exports and prices due to the great depression, and subsequent tax hikes to alleviate the loss of coffee revenue combined with the social oppression Haitians felt to spark riots and the beginning of the America's withdrawing from the occupation.[82]

The Aftermath

Haiti celebrated the end of its 1915-1934 occupation as a second independence, country-wide celebrations were held, peaceful demonstrations occurred in the streets, and cheers were heard throughout the island. Visibly, the second independence was far less tortuous than the first. Haiti now possessed a modernized infrastructure built largely by Marine use of the *corvee* system. Haiti now had the shell of government institutions created by American specialists from the State Department and Haiti now fielded the most professional military force in their history. Nonetheless, Haiti still had the same *stateness* problems, prior regime problems, and lack of democratic precondition problems that plagued them prior to and during the occupation. The authors of *Written in Blood* use a vignette derived from Haiti's sole brewery which ceased bottling operations shortly after the occupation to summarize Haiti's post-occupation state of affairs as "old problems in new bottles."[83]

Though the new bottles did not completely shatter for a couple decades they started cracking when the old problems resurfaced, less than one year after Haiti had celebrated its

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[81] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 170-171.

[82] Ibid, 196.

[83] Robert D. Heinl, Nancy G. Heinl, and Michael Heinl, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995*, 492.

second independence. On August 15, 1934, the last Marines left Haiti and in February 1935 President Stenio Vincent, the third of three Haitian presidents elected during the 1915-1934 occupation, transferred control of all state economic matters to himself. In March 1935 the plotters of the first post-occupation presidential coup were arrested. In June 1935 a new constitution was adopted that vested "Citizen Stenio Vincent" with a second term in office starting in May 1936 which was his originally scheduled end of term.[84]

Less than one year after the United States had departed from Haiti the stage for its return had already started building momentum. Until then, the United States remained engaged in Haitian affairs because it was still viewed as key real estate from a *Monroe Doctrine* perspective. Haiti's lack of natural resources and the high margins expected by its investors kept Haiti's economy dependent on exports, the majority of which were intended for the United States. In the mid 1960s, roughly three decades after the occupation, Haiti's new bottles were entirely shattered and on display for the world to see. It registered last among countries throughout the Western Hemisphere in virtually every metric applicable to development and has continued being so ever since.[85]

United States Intervention in Haiti, 1994-1997

The Environment

When the United States withdrew from Haiti in 1934, the presence of functioning democratic institutions crafted during the occupation was accepted as proof positive of a successful transition to democratic governance. However, the absence of internalized democratic principles and thinking was proven when these same institutions became once again

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[84] Ibid, 489-495.

[85] Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, 231-237.

dysfunctional within a year of the occupation's end. A democratic transition imposed on a country through authoritarian methods and tactics failing to lead to a consolidated democracy and instead returning to the country's preexisting authoritarian tendencies should be of no surprise. The period between the first and second American occupations of Haiti were characterized by the same problems seen prior to the first occupation with a subtle but significant difference, *negritude*.

The international *negritude* movement started gaining traction in Haiti around 1915; its core principle was Black Nationalism. The movement's influence grew over the next several decades as lighter-skinned blacks and mulattos were increasingly identified with the ruling class which had traditionally exploited the working class throughout Haiti's history. *Negritude* and the continuous political turmoil resulting in the non-peaceful transfer of power of seven state executives from 1934-1957 resulted in the election of the poster-child of *negritude*, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier.[86] Papa Doc's ability to harness Black Nationalism and the indigent class' belief in voodoo differentiated his brand of authoritarianism from that of his predecessors. That ability also empowered him to declare himself President for life as he transitioned his rule to a sultanistic style of governance.

Papa Doc was distrustful of Haiti's traditional power bases, the Army and the wealthy mulattos, so he formed his own power base from Haiti's indigent class. After having personally suppressed a coup attempt in July 1958 he created a presidential guard which grew to be a militia named the Volunteers for National Security, better known as *Tonton Macoutes* the Creole term for bogeyman. By 1961 this extrajudicial force had grown to become larger than the Army and answerable to no one other than Papa Doc himself. He also routinely fired Army chiefs of staff as well as the officers trained by Marines during the occupation. His consolidation of the monopoly

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[86] Ibid, 23.

of violence ensured he would not suffer the fate of former Haitian President Dumarais Estime, who was also Papa Doc's former professor and boss. Papa Doc's purges then moved to organized labor, student activist groups, parents of activist students, the Catholic Church, and even international opposition when he expelled foreign chiefs of mission at will. The United States' reaction was muted; it had more pressing matters in the form of an escalating Cold War, Cuban missile crisis, and Vietnam War.[87]

Papa Doc's 18-year old son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, peacefully assumed power in 1971 after his father's natural death in office. Although Papa Doc's strangle-hold on Haiti facilitated a peaceful transition, Baby Doc's weak leadership style and economic tensions in Haiti eroded the Duvalierist power base. The reduction of economic aid from the United States as it sought to pressure the Haitian government into increasingly liberal policies was among those tensions. Since the United States' financial aid to Haiti represented over half of the Haitian government's budget in the late 1970s the regime compensated for the reduction by increasing its corruption practices further alienating the population. The recession in the 1980s exacerbated the situation to the point that when the United States delayed aid in January 1986 Baby Doc saw no other alternative than to flee Haiti on February 8, 1986.[88]

Haiti had a fleeting moment during which it could have transitioned to a representative government in the post-Duvalier era. Unfortunately, the interim government council led by a military general started to consolidate power in the authoritarian fashion it had seen done so many times throughout Haitian history. After several equally typical coups, a new sultanistic leader named Jean-Bertrand Aristide emerged on December 16, 1990, from relatively free popular

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[87] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States military campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*, 30-36.

[88] Ibid, 39-41.

elections overseen by the international community.[89] He was able to harness the powerful combination of *negritudinal* passions and a renewed religious movement to become Haiti's first freely elected President. Aristide was also a priest who had been recently dismissed by the Catholic Church because of his increasing militancy over the past decade; a militancy that rose to a feverish pitch especially during his public speeches. The content of Aristide's speeches alienated the traditional power bases in Haiti and the masses who were his sole remaining supporters had long lost the influence they held under Papa Doc. It was simply a matter of time before Aristide would be removed from office for reasons other than his expiration of term, a fate suffered quite similarly to that of nearly every Haitian Head of State before him. That time came on September 29, 1991, when Haitian Army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, successful overthrew Aristide and become the *raison d'etre* for the United States' next occupation of Haiti.

Haitian Stateness

Indications that Haitian society was not as bifurcated as generally accepted had been present since its independence but not fully recognized until the latter part of the 20th century and even then still not universally. The World Peace Foundation blamed elites for the lack of a social contract between the state and its nation, positing that Aristide was finally able to unite the cultural elements of language, religion, race, and ethnicity into a national identity.[90] However, this theory ignores the litany of Haitian rulers of humble origin, from its first President up to and including its most notorious President. Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who was born into slavery, proclaimed Haiti an independent country and himself as its Emperor in 1804, he was assassinated

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[89] Ibid, 42-45.

[90] Jennifer McCoy, World Peace Foundation, Haitian Studies Association, and University of Puerto Rico, *Haiti: Prospects for political and economic reconstruction* (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 1995).

in 1806. Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier, who born of a father who was a Justice of the Peace and a mother who was a baker, had an unremarkable medical career prior to taking office in 1957. Proclaiming himself President for life in 1964, he died in 1971 of natural causes while still in office.

Political Scientist Robert Fatton Jr. presents a theory of the Haitian national identity being segmented into three distinct groups: neo-Duvalierists, quasi-bourgeois, and radical populists. The neo-Duvalierists are defined as an authoritarian coalition seeking to establish a predatory state in the post-Duvalier era, but the definition fits every authoritarian ruler in Haitian history. The quasi-bourgeois population represents Haitian society's capitalist class that has been present since Columbus discovered the island in 1942 and exploited its native Indians. Finally, the radical populist class that represents the masses possesses social democratic tendencies that easily correlate with the newly freed slaves of 1804 Haiti. He suggests that these groups hinder democratic transition and consolidation because none are above subjugating the other through violence and oppression or engaging in opportunism. The result is the failure of a key democratic tenet, a majority seeking to establish societal rules that protect temporarily disadvantaged segments of society from the predatory rule of leaders they do not identify with.[91]

According to the Linz & Stepan framework, the degree of nationalism under LTG Cedras characterized by the multiple militant nations (or segments) present and a state leadership seeking to become a nation-state generate so much conflict and repression that democracy is highly improbable. Again, the validity of the framework is confirmed.[92]

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[91] Robert Fatton, Jr., "The Impairments of Democratization: Haiti in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 31:2 (1999), 215-216.

[92] Refer to Figure 1.

Haiti's Prior Regimes

The manipulated elections from 1915-1934, during the United States occupation of Haiti cycled the country through three consecutive full-term governments, with relatively peaceful transitions covering a 25-year period. The well-documented manipulation of Haitian elections by the United States aside, it was a feat Haiti had not achieved since its independence in 1804 and one that has eluded it ever since.[93] The period between the first and second United States' interventions in Haiti lasted nearly six decades. During that period Haiti continued its trend of cycling through predatory heads of state as it experienced seven coups, three temporary civilian governments, three temporary military juntas, one natural death, and only one full term in office. The fact that there were15 government transitions, of which only half were peaceful, within a 60-year period is disquieting at best. Considering that two of the heads of state during that period, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier and Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, accounted for fully half of that period these statistics approach disturbing.[94]

Most of those governments displayed authoritarian characteristics, but the increasing levels of *negritude* during the Duvalier reign and the awakening of the radical populists in the post-Duvalier era introduced a sultanistic characteristic to the Haitian political equation. In hindsight, the absence in rule of law which was an ideology characterized mostly by opportunism and the repression of societal segments that were not currently in power combined with a mobilization derived almost exclusively by the personality of the ruler was a fertile environment for such a style of leadership.

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[93] U.S. Congress, Senate, *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic*, 67th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rep., 1922, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/haiti_inquiry.htm (accessed July 29, 2009).

[94] Embassy of Haiti, "List of Haitian Heads of State."

Though some may characterize the Duvaliers and Cedras as totalitarian, they lacked the utopian ideology and party affiliations characteristic of such regimes. The Duvaliers and Aristide I were sultanistic, their sole ideology was themselves. Cedras exercised a militaristic brand of totalitarianism that sought the classist utopia of iron rule, and Aristide II having learned from his earlier experience in power gravitated away from sultanism towards authoritarianism. The Linz & Stepan model again holds true as the following string of events are matched against it framework: Papa Doc died and a family member replaced him, Baby Doc was overthrown through a combination of domestic pressure and abandonment by its hegemon sponsor, Aristide was overthrown by a coup, and arena issues made democracy impossible for the junta. Finally, Cedras was defeated by a war (intervention) and democracy was possible almost exclusively through an occupation by a democratic regime and externally monitored elections.[95]

The United States' Plan

In October 1991, less than one month after Cedras had taken power, the United States suspended all aid to Haiti and froze Haitian government assets held in America. The President of the United States prohibited American citizens and firms from executing financial transactions with the Haitian government and supported the Organization of American States' (OAS) embargo against Haiti with American troops.[96] The OAS' LAC members were nervous about the possibility of their own militaries following Cedras' example so they denounced the coup just days after it occurred and applied continuous pressure on the junta. The OAS' members were

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[95] Refer to Figure 2-3.

[96] U.S. General Accounting Office, *Haiti, Costs of U.S. Programs and Activities since the 1991 Military Coup*, Fact sheet for the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993); U.S. General Aecounting Office, *Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda*, Report to the majority leader, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

reluctant to use military force, but the pressure they applied helped to legitimize an intervention option should the United States choose to use it.[97]

The international community made incessant overtures to Cedras in the hopes of persuading him to cede power peacefully, but the increasing number of Haitian boatpeople spiked domestic political pressure in the United States. In the meantime Cedras continued thumbing his nose at the international community, including the United States, by ignoring their deadlines for him stepping down from power and expelling international monitors.[98] On October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County arrived in the bay of Port-au-Prince on an advisory mission to Haiti. It was prevented from docking due to a cordon of strategically anchored ships, roving gunboats in the harbor, and drunken armed hooligans who were chanting anti-American slogans on the wharf. On October 14, the ship sailed back to the United States without having completed its mission; only eight days after 18 Rangers had been killed in Somalia this was another blow to the American administration's global standing and an intervention was virtually guaranteed at that point.[99]

A special report published by the Strategic Studies Institute in October 1994, bore a strong resemblance to the plan the United States implemented during its September 1994 invasion and subsequent occupation of Haiti.[100] The Report suggested that in a dysfunctional society like Haiti where the law of the gun prevails generations of reform would be required to see any substantive progress in governance. It predicted that restoring Aristide was simple but it would be an intervention fraught with peril and potential failure once the mission was turned over to the

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[97] Randall Parish and Mark Peceny, "Kantian Liberalism and the Collective Defense of Democracy in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research* 39:2 (2002), 244.

[98] Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion:" A concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 43.

[99] Ibid, 35-42.

[100] Gabriel Marcella and Strategic Studies Institute, *Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1994), 3-8.

United Nations and Aristide. The Report also suggested that the United States should pursue extremely limited objectives such as humanitarian assistance and the critical tests of legitimacy that include restoring judicial and police functions rather than social and political reform which is exactly what the United States did.[101] To be more specific, the American-led multinational force conducted four interrelated missions consisting of security improvement, weapons' buyback programs, humanitarian assistance, and the repatriation of Haitian refugees from Guantanamo Bay while being careful every step of the way not to supplant Haitian institutions.[102]

The Arenas

Civil Society:

Upon Baby Doc's departure from Haiti, its civil society was awakened and it developed very rapidly as if to make-up for lost time. Within the capital, strong societal bonds developed along economic lines through professional groups, trade unions, religious groups, and women's advocate groups. Other groups formed according to political affiliation but were weakened by their fragmented nature in loosely supporting one of the multitudes of available candidates. Civil society formed in the countryside around agricultural and literacy initiatives. The political groupings mirrored their civil society and displayed the tendency to vote in accordance with their perceived existential needs.[103]

The incremental developments that had taken place in Haitian civil society since the overthrow of Baby Doc were eliminated shortly after Cedras overthrew Aristide. Within weeks, the military junta virtually banned public meetings and organizations by requiring organizers to

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[101] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*, 119.

[102] Ibid, 157.

[103] Kelly McCown, *Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti* (New York: Human Rights Watch Publishing, 1993), 4-6.

identify themselves at the local police station 48-hours prior to their event. Meanwhile, Haitian police and military personnel stormed such meetings and accused the attendees of being Aristide supporters then intimidated, beat, or arrested them. The regime did not consider any collective event too sacred for such oppression the victims included: rural development organizations, political groups, social rights activist groups, trade unions, literacy groups, former Aristide supporters, unfriendly press, and even religious groups.[104]

The Catholic Church suffered greatly due to Aristide's Catholic background. There were dozens of reports about priests being arrested, harassed, and shot at especially after a local bishop sent an open letter to the Vatican criticizing it for recognizing the coup.[105] In another reported incident a meeting was held by a school to plan the remainder of the school year in light of the political strife. Haitian soldiers cordoned off the school for nearly 24-hours before eventually arresting and torturing 100-150 students. The students were visited in jail by the head of the Haitian Center for Human Rights who also happened to be the wife of the prime minister. She told them she could arrange for their release if they denied ever having been beaten.[106]

The implications of the prior-regime types on the civil arena match the Linz & Stepan model. For example, civil society's autonomy was low under Papa Doc's authoritarianism-turned-sultanism, then rose to moderate levels under Baby Doc's sultanism-turned-authoritarianism, next reached medium levels under Aristide I's authoritarianism, and was fell back to low levels under Cedras' totalitarianism practically overnight. In each case the citizenry's freedom to voice grievances through public discourse rather than violent conflict resolution,

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[104] Ibid, 5-6.

[105] Ibid, 79, 92.

[106] Ibid, 63.

whether organized or not, was never achieved because of its trifecta of opportunistic societal groups.[107]

Political Society:

As Baby Doc's power and influence eroded, the quasi-bourgeois seized the opportunity to climb out of its subordinate role in the balance of power that had formed during Papa Doc's rule. It allied itself with the radical populists to oust Duvalier but when Aristide took power they felt threatened by his militancy so they welcomed the military coup that ousted Aristide.[108] Democracy requires the mobilization of a majority that seeks to protect the rights that they are denied yet are enjoyed by a privileged minority. Again, the three opportunistic classes of Haitian society that had so plagued its levels of *stateness* and civil society were now wreaking havoc on its political society. External influences also had a negative effect on Haitian political society. During the first month of the coup, the United States strongly condemned the military junta and its actions. However, in November 1991 as boat people started fleeing Haiti in droves, the criticism stopped due to its contradiction with American attempts at portraying the boat people as economic rather than political refugees.[109] When Aristide was reinstated, he clearly indicated he had learned the lesson about alienating the other two strata of Haitian society stemming from his thinking that he was untouchable. He deliberately sought out pacts with his opponents, albeit limited but pacts nonetheless, enabling him to successfully complete his term and peacefully transition power.[110] There was finally hope in Haiti that its political society could create a

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[107] Refer to Figure 4.

[108] Robert Fatton, Jr., "The Impairments of Democratization: Haiti in Comparative Perspective," 217-218.

[109] Kelly McCown, *Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti*, 12.

[110] Robert Fatton, Jr., "The Impairments of Democratization: Haiti in Comparative Perspective," 220.

governmental framework that best represented the broad societal objectives agreed upon by its civil society in the post-Duvalier era.

Rule of Law:

It is a well-documented fact that rule of law has been non-existent during the vast majority of Haiti's history. The facts about Haitian rule of law that are germane to this study begin during Aristide's first term as Haiti's first true democratically-elected President. Aristide had long been known for his charismatic fire-branding speeches criticizing Baby Doc's regime as well as the half-dozen regimes after Baby Doc was overthrown, but the increasing political slant and militancy of these speeches spurred the Catholic Church into dismissing him from the priesthood.

As the democratically elected President, Aristide's militancy did not lessen and he was recorded giving at least two speeches which blatantly displayed his contempt for the non-populist groups in Haiti. In one speech he said that there were two types of stones in existence, those that lay in rivers and are kept cool by its waters then those that lay on riverbanks and suffer in the hot sun. The time had come for the stones on the riverbank to experience the luxuries enjoyed by the stones in the river and the stones in the river to experience the suffering of the stones on the riverbank. The message was clear, as the people's president he would engage in opportunism on behalf of the radical populists to redistribute the country's wealth. In another speech he suggested that the smell of his neck-laced enemies was a good smell, a sweet smell that he looked forward to enjoying. He was clearly advocating retribution by using the term neck-lacing which is a technique often used by Haitian lynch-mobs when killing a person by placing a burning tire around their neck.[111] It was readily apparent that Aristide I would not develop rule of law in Haiti, and the United States reinstating him to power was another mixed signal added to an ever-

[111] Ibid, 221.

lengthening list of mixed signals that had started in 1804. By mid-1995 a small but significant number of politically linked crimes started implicating Aristide's regime in acts of retribution against Cedras supporters causing some to wonder if Haiti could ever establish rule of law.

The United States' plan to develop rule of law in Haiti was to convince the government to raise police salaries to discourage corruption, but judges' salaries remained relatively low creating the risk that corruption would increase in the judiciary. Additionally, judges feared retribution from criminals and prior regime supporters when multi-national forces left resulting in an inconsistent application of rule of law. Another problem was the illiteracy of junior-level judicial officials as well as the large number of judicial officials that lacked legal training. The United States found that many in the judicial branch created laws on the fly because of their lack of education and training, and the difficulty of navigating the antiquated form of the Napoleonic Code that served as the basis for legal authority in Haiti. Other problems hampering legal reform were the scarce access to courts experienced by remote populations and the poor condition of courthouses and prisons.[112] Reforming the legal system seemed to be a bridge too far, so the United States focused on retraining police forces.

American rules of engagement (ROE) consisted of letting Haitian authorities handle domestic issues until a few police beatings were witnessed by American congressmen and televised by the media, a revision to the ROE preventing abuses was quickly implement which had a calming effect on the populace.[113] In October 1995, the United States started a three-phased reformation of Haitian police forces: first, vetting soldiers for suitability for immediate commissioning in the national police force; second, integrating international police monitors into patrols as mentors to the Haitian police; and third, training new police. Immediately establishing a

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[112] Jennifer McCoy, World Peace Foundation, Haitian Studies Association, and University of Puerto Rico, *Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction*, 19-22.

[113] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States military campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*, 133.

police force had several significantly positive results including the reduction of unemployment, expanding Haitian involvement in improving their own security, and drastically improving the levels of rule of law throughout the country. The effort suffered a few setbacks like Aristide dismissing Cedras' police section chiefs and forcing the Army to disband by cutting off its funding before the new police force had sufficient numbers to fill the power vacuum.[114] Nonetheless, the level of development in rule of law enabled by the intervention was sufficient to protect democratic behavior.

State Institutions:

Haitian history is rife with state leaders that have usurped state funds at the expense of institutional development; a habit characteristic of sultanistic regimes. The Duvaliers had behaved in this manner; it was not a novelty in Haitian history nor was it a surprise. On the other hand the degree to which the Duvaliers, Baby Doc in particular, merged public and private institutions and funds was out of the norm. Baby Doc further refined Haiti's template of predatory governance by adding state monopolies to the comingling of state institutions and skimming of foreign aid. These monopolies included utility companies and commodities like soybean oil, wheat flour, cement, and sugar.[115]

Haitian heads of state also had a habit of neglecting institutions that invested in the development or well-being of their citizens. As recently as the 1990s, 85-95% of primary and secondary level schools were private and the few existing educational standards were not enforced. Additional educational challenges faced by Haiti included an overall lack of adult literacy programs, only an estimated 10% of teachers hired annually being fully qualified, and the majority of students experiencing access issues especially in rural areas. Unfortunately, there is

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[114] Ibid, 141.

[115] Jennifer McCoy, World Peace Foundation, Haitian Studies Association, and University of Puerto Rico, *Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction*, 11.

an overall lack of quantitative data from which to fully assess the true levels of educational deficiencies in Haiti, the reality might be worse.[116]

The United States formed ministerial advisory teams from Army reservists, state department specialists, and private citizens holding jobs in America that correlated to those that they served as advisers. This is an aspect of the occupation in which the United States demonstrated it had not forgotten the lessons it had learned from the first American occupation of Haiti in 1915-1934. Whether the advisors worked at the ministry of education, health, or justice, they ensured Haitians were placed in leading positions. The decision to develop state institutions in this manner garnered the benefits of training the individuals responsible for the same duties they would perform once American forces left and lent the institutions strong credibility because they were staffed with personnel that had been nominated by a freely elected president and confirmed by freely elected parliamentary officials.[117]

Economic Society:

The embargo that was enacted by the OAS and enforced by the United States against Haiti, caused Haiti's GDP to drop by 30% during Cedras' 1991-1994 rule. To put this into perspective, during the Duvalier regimes which held political oppression, human atrocities, corruption, an AIDS scare and all the negative light these issues carry with them the economy remained relatively flat at 0.9% growth from 1965-1980. The 1980s financial crisis combined with Haiti neglecting its natural resources resulted in the contraction of its GDP by 2.4% from 1980-1982.[118]

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[116] Ibid, 13-16.

[117] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti*, 1994-1997, 150-153.

[118] Jennifer McCoy, World Peace Foundation, Haitian Studies Association, and University of Puerto Rico, *Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction*, 7.

Another major economic issue was the slash and burn practice of using trees as a source of fuel (charcoal). The combination of this practice and low levels of government reforestation resulted in a significant decrease in subsistence agriculture during the later part of the 20th century. In 1950, Haiti had nearly one acre per person of arable land, and by 2000 the amount of arable land in Haiti had been reduced to just less than half an acre per person. The diminished ability to sustain themselves in the countryside forced many Haitians to relocate to the cities at a rate that greatly surpassed the number of jobs being created in the economy.[119] Although some theorists have attributed the economic recovery to the intervention, it most likely resulted from the lifting of the embargo against Haiti. In any case, the economy showed a slow but steady pace of recovery and although it was not as fast as some would have liked the reality is that slow economic growth is best for the economy and population. [120]

The Aftermath:

Barely 18 months after the intervention began; the United States transferred operational authority to the United Nations effectively ending Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in March 1995. The United Nations, which still has forces in Haiti today, successfully supported Haitian the elections that led to Haiti's first peaceful transition of power between two democratically elected presidents in December 1995. Rene Preval, Aristide's former Prime Minister and fellow exile, is the current President of Haiti.[121] During most of the decade between the 1994 and 2004 interventions, the two alternated back and forth as Haiti's President but Aristide would eventually find himself exiled for continuing to stray towards his authoritarian tendencies reportedly by the hegemon sponsor that had reinstated him to begin with, the United States. Nonetheless, it seemed

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[119] Ibid, 8.

[120] John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States military campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*, 166, 229.

[121] Ibid, 167.

Haiti had finally hit rock bottom and was willing to build a less privileged yet collaborative society rather than a privileged subset within a fragmented society. The arenas in Haiti continued improving incrementally but inconclusively due to external influences.

On January 12, 2010, at 4:53pm local time (2153 GMT) a 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck approximately 15 miles (25km) west-southwest of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, at a depth of approximately 8.1 miles (13km).122 The earthquake, just one of more than a dozen natural disasters suffered by Haiti in the past decade, effectively destroyed the country's capital as well as the frail gains in self-governance it had finally achieved in only the last decade. The global response to this disaster has been truly remarkable yet the global community, Haitians included, is understandably apprehensive about Haiti's future. Specifically, that despite the tremendous investment of resources and effort in helping Haiti to help itself, that it will revert to its usual habit of failing at self-governance. If the rebuilding is done with consideration to Haiti's *stateness*, prior-regime type, available path, and preconditions to democratic consolidation it has excellent chances of becoming the model for modern democratization.

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[122] U.S. Geological Survey Newsroom, *"Prelimary Report,"* U.S. Geological Survey, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/#details (accessed February 12, 2010).

Chapter Four– Conclusion and Recommendations

Modern consolidated democracies are complex adaptive systems that rely on a set of complex adaptive subsystems which dictate the respective democracy's ability to become viable and sustainable form of governance. These subsystems are composed of five interrelated arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, the state apparatus, and economic society. The arenas cannot function properly without the interrelated support of one or more other arenas, and each is affected by a country's level of nationalism, previous regime-type, and transition path available. Linz & Stepan introduce a framework that accounts for these complexities but could be improved by including the identity as a factor of *Stateness*.

That America's inconsistent foreign policy towards Haiti has helped as much as it has hurt Haitian efforts of developing a consolidated representative government is readily apparent in Haiti's history. The United States hurt Haiti's efforts when it failed to recognize it as only the second independent country in the Western Hemisphere, and instead sided with France by actually joining an embargo against Haiti. It also hurt Haiti's efforts by occupying it from 1915-1934 for nothing more than American self-interests and managing the occupation with precisely that attitude. The United States helped Haiti during the second occupation by pressuring predatory rulers from office, albeit again in American self-interests in stopping the flow of boatpeople, and restoring Aristide could be argued in either direction.

The United States' inconsistent economic policies towards Haiti, as well as the incoherent strategies of financial aid allocations to Haiti, have also helped and hurt Haiti. For example, the significant increases in aid during Papa Doc's oppressive regime in late 1959 and 1976, then a significant reduction in aid during the 1996 peaceful transfer of power from Aristide to Preval.



Figure 6: created by the author using USAID data.

Nonetheless, the United States' 1994 intervention and occupation of Haiti was by all accounts exponentially more successful than its 1915 intervention and occupation. The United States had successfully applied the lessons it learned from its previous occupation in Haiti, but still failed in one aspect. It failed to recognize Haiti's *Stateness* and prior regime-type issues, thus failed to choose the requisite path available in developing the preconditions for Haiti to experience a successful democratic transition and consolidation. The United States in fact deliberately chose to avoid developing Haiti's civil society, the cornerstone of democratic thinking in favor of developing Haiti's ability to protect democratic behavior. The United States successfully sought to enable incremental progress that was shallow and superficial in nature, rather than the enduring qualities of profound societal reformation. By no means am I trying to imply that Haitians should be absolved of any blame, for they bear the brunt of responsibility for their plight, but this is not about Haiti. This is about the United States as the leader of the free world and the manner in which we implement our foreign policies, in particular the manner in which we export democracy through the sacrifice of our uniformed service members and at the expense of client countries.

Our doctrine and the path-dependent approach agree on the five arenas being the preconditions for democratic consolidation, but they differ on the pathway to developing these arenas. A frequent theme in our doctrine is to be culturally aware in order to prevent provoking ill-will and uncooperative behavior, rather than being culturally aware in order to develop the approach that has the best chances of achieving a sustainable democracy. Our doctrine should radically reform its position and depth on the subject of democratic attitudes, beliefs, and principles. Our doctrine only addresses the potential of a country to achieve democracy; our doctrine fails to address its propensity. The path-dependent approach is a step towards addressing propensity by identifying the options available to a country based on its preexisting values and beliefs. Our approach would read:

"What path should Country A take in order to achieve the five preconditions that enable it to internalize the attitudinal, behavioral, and constitutional dimensions of a representative government, given its history, characteristics of Stateness, and political system?"

The United States military's counterinsurgency / lines of effort approach to stability operations also fails to appreciate and harness the propensity of a fragile state's pact between government and governed. The few stability operations' successes we have had were despite and coincidental to our counterinsurgency approach to stability operations, not because of it. Exporting democracy is not always possible, given their current situation some countries will not successful achieve self-determination. The blood and treasure of the United States deserve an approach that optimizes the chance of success and minimizes their sacrifice when presented with situations where a democratic transition would not likely succeed. Our current approach does not fulfill this requirement, the path-dependent approach is far better suited in doing so. In order to consider this approach we must start realistically identifying the true causality of our current results, break from the ideological dissonance of forcing democracy by allowing countries the opportunity to have the form of government they want, and to help them to do so by developing their ability to formulate a pact between the government and the governed.

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